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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
5.1. Conclusion 
This research aims to examine and to investigate the audit quality of 
companies that perform audit by different size of audit firm, different length 
of tenure, and different types of auditor rotation. The dependent variable in 
this research is audit quality which is proxied by abnormal working capital 
accruals (AWCA). While the independent variables are public accountant 
firm size, audit tenure, auditor rotation, and types of auditor rotation (which 
is divided into mandatory rotation and pseudo mandatory rotation). Samples 
of this research are nonfinancial companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) in the period of 2002-2015. 
Based on the analysis and discussion that has been done in this 
research, the results of this research have the following conclusions. First, 
sample shows the number of company which audited by BIG4 or non-BIG4 
averagely the same (696:718). The average length of tenure is 2.42 years. 
The company that rotates their auditor only 460 out of 1414 samples 
(32.53%). The different size of audit firm also shows averagely the same 
number of rotation been done (BIG4= 220 rotation; Non-BIG4= 240 
rotation). For the types of rotation been done, it is 5.87% mandatory, 1.91% 
pseudo mandatory, and 26.66% voluntary. 
Second, the value of adjusted-R square is 0.064. It implies low effect 
of independent variables in explaining dependent variable (audit quality). 
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Nevertheless, the F-test already shows that the model is appropriate in 
explaining the research itself. The probability of F value is in lower value 
rather than the acceptable error 5% with F value 13.100. 
Third, individually, variable BIG4, MNDT, and PSEUDO are 
statistically significant. It implies that public accountant firm size, 
mandatory rotation, and pseudo mandatory rotation have significant 
influence on audit quality. Meanwhile, variable TEN and ROTA are not 
statistically significant. It implies that audit tenure and auditor rotation do 
not have influence on audit quality. 
Fourth, public accountant firm size has negative effect with the audit 
quality. It implies that companies that are audited by BIG4 have lower 
quality than that of audited by non-BIG4. This conclusion is different from 
DeAngelo’s (1981), Choi et al.’s (2010), and Zakaria and Daud’s (2013) 
results that concluded that BIG4 firms will deliver better audit quality rather 
than non-BIG4. 
Fifth, audit tenure has positive effect with the audit quality. It implies 
that company with longer tenure will deliver higher audit quality. The 
conclusion is different from Carey and Simnett’s (2006), Siregar et al.’s 
(2012), and Panjaitan and Chariri’s (2014) results that conclude that lengthy 
tenure might impair and deteriorate the auditor independence. 
Sixth, auditor rotation has a positive effect on the audit quality. It 
implies that auditor rotation increase the quality of audit. It is not in 
accordance with Febrianto (2009), who stated that an indication of a 
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company that change their auditor before the maximum tenure due to 
previous auditor acts conservatively and not in line with the interests of the 
management. It might implies the tendency of a company to rotate their 
audit firm is reflected in a good way. 
Seventh, mandatory rotation has a positive effect with the audit 
quality. It implies that the Indonesia’s government regulation regarding 
mandatory rotation might have a good result because increasing the audit 
quality. It is in accordance with the view of longer tenure will impair auditor 
independence. The result also supports the regulator views that believe one 
solution of longer tenure is implementation of the mandatory rotation. It is 
because such regulation will force the company to rotate its auditor when 
they achieved the maximum engagement period. The result also support 
some studies conducted by Carey & Simnett (2006), Daniels & Booker 
(2009), and Wibowo & Rossieta (2009). 
Eight, pseudo mandatory rotation has a negative effect on the audit 
quality. It implies that pseudo mandatory rotation decreases the quality of 
audit. Pseudo mandatory is a loophole in audit regulation in the Indonesia 
(Siregar et al. 2012; Junaidi et al. 2014). Even it is legal by the regulation, 
but it is a way to extend the period of engagement. The question relevant to 
this issue, among others, are (a) Why an audit firm wants to stay with a 
client for that long?; (b) Why a company still want to be audited by that firm 
even though it is exceed the maximum time of engagement? The intention 
by the audit firm and management that want to be still together, resulting in 
a negative result as found in this research. 
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5.2. Research Limitations 
1. This research only examine and investigate the relationship between 
public accountant firm size, audit tenure, auditor rotation, and types of 
auditor rotation with audit quality in the nonfinancial sector. 
2. The audit quality only measured by one proxy which is abnormal 
working capital (AWCA) that is also a proxy of earnings quality. 
3. Autocorrelation test is not satisfied the BLUE requirements in OLS 
because the regression model exposes positive autocorrelation. 
4. The variable for audit tenure, auditor rotation, and types of auditor 
rotation only assess for the audit firm, it does not include the audit 
partner where in Indonesia regulate for both audit firm and audit partner. 
5. The variable for audit tenure and pseudo rotation did not in the same line 
with each other. It means, the effect of pseudo mandatory did not be 
added to the tenure itself to include pseudo tenure. 
 
5.3. Suggestions 
1. The next research can use another proxy for audit quality beside one is 
used for earnings quality, such as the auditor opinion that is become as an 
output of auditor work with its client. Therefore, auditor opinion might 
reflect the auditor performance in conducting the audit. So that, it can be 
used in determining the audit quality. 
2. The next research can use multiple proxies from different views, in order 
to get comprehensive examination and analysis. It can be from earnings 
quality (discretionary accruals/ abnormal working capital/ earnings 
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surprise benchmark), audit report (going concern opinion), or market 
reaction (earnings response coefficient). 
3. The next research may use different criteria for variable tenure, such as 
normal tenure which reflect in the regulation, also pseudo tenure that will 
extent the tenure itself. 
